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## The U.S. Government Response To Terrorism: In Search of an Effective Strategy

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surprise. Against the Soviets on the central front speed may be more effective than mass in such cushioning of an attack, and hence in deterring it. Mobility and flexibility may be more important than, and have to be traded for, quantity and quality. It is a big decision.

Much of what Betts reviews is, fortunately, increasingly understood by our planners. His penetrating assessment reminds us of the cost of inattention to the lessons.

GEORGE W. BAER  
Naval War College

Herz, Martin F. *215 Days In The Life Of An American Ambassador*. Washington, D.C.: School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1981. 269pp. \$9.85

Martin F. Herz has published his diary, covering a period of a little more than half a year. It shows what an Ambassador to a small Eastern European country thinks about and does. This is an insider's book. I read it with great interest, because I have known Ambassador Herz for a number of years, and because I was his predecessor in Bulgaria, several times removed. It is difficult to see naval officers and others with a casual interest in the personalities and world of the US Foreign Service finding the same interest in this book which I did.

Ambassador Herz is very, very smart. All those who have known and worked with him recognize this fact. He is also sharp-edged, as he himself had the grace to make clear in this little volume.

For those who care about the American Government's way of appointing ambassadors and the cost in human suffering among Foreign Service officers and their families, Ambassador Herz's description of the process in chapter twelve is a sad, poignant and haunting story. Having been Director General of the US Foreign  
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Service myself when Martin Herz was appointed to Bulgaria and when, perhaps, the bad things described were done to Ambassador Herz's friend, I find his description coming close to home. Ambassador Herz eloquently describes the damage done to professionalism in US diplomacy when unqualified people become political appointees, and intelligent management of human resources in the US Foreign Service is blocked.

Intellectually, I am with Ambassador Herz all the way. So far as Bulgaria is concerned, however, I wish he had liked that beautiful country and those fascinating people a little better than he seems to have done. He remembers and vividly describes the hidden microphones, boring dinner parties, denigrating jokes, and sick headaches of those who had been in Bulgaria too long. I do not deny the truth in all these observations. I also know that Ambassador Herz's life was touched by misfortune during his Bulgarian stay. I only wish that he had felt some greater sense of his good fortune in having had the chance to work and live in Sofia as the US Ambassador.

None of the foregoing changes the fact that Martin Herz has one of the sharpest and most penetrating minds among those Americans concerned with foreign affairs. His political judgment is excellent, and his comments about the workings of the US diplomatic establishment are always insightful.

NATHANIEL DAVIS  
Naval War College

Farrell, William Regis. *The U.S. Government Response To Terrorism: In Search of an Effective Strategy*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. 142pp. \$20

While the battle against terrorism evokes the image of armed units engaged in a siege, there is an equally significant

battle that is largely ignored by the general public. It is the bureaucratic struggle among officials and policy makers who are either required, or wish, to play a role in a highly visible matter of public policy. Terrorism has become a subject of bureaucratic politics and William Farrell has written a fine study of aspects of this conflict in *The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of an Effective Strategy*.

Lt. Col. Farrell provides a trenchant analysis of the evolution of US policies toward terrorism from the Munich Massacre to 1981. By drawing on pertinent public documents and using interviews with key officials skillfully, he provides the reader with insights into the problems of policy formulation and execution that can accompany any new area of public concern.

After presenting an overview on the nature of terrorism, the author discusses key aspects of organizational behavior that should be appreciated in understanding how the federal bureaucracy responds to the threat. Farrell, for example, notes that "governments perceive problems through organizational sensors," (p. 21) and an awareness of this and related considerations can help us to appreciate how different organizations have been mobilized to meet the challenge. However, while such observations are useful in sensitizing the reader to key aspects of "The Organizational Perspective," the points that are raised are not fully applied in the body of the analysis.

In Chapter 4, "Government Structure to Counter Terrorism," Dr. Farrell illustrates the problems of coordination that result from the fact that by 1979 some "31 Federal Agencies and Departments" (p. 37) were involved in dealing with the challenge. While the use of the lead agency concept in the event of actual incidents could lessen problems of

command and control, the number of players make it very difficult to develop fully integrated programs ranging from prevention to post-incident measures.

The author discusses additional problems resulting from the role of the military, particularly in reference to domestic acts of terrorism. He deals effectively with the constraints related to *posse comitatus* and places the issue of military involvement in the broader context of civil-military relations.

After providing a solid overview of the different types of threats that could be encountered by US citizens and organizations both domestically and overseas, Farrell underscores the fact that the congressional response in Senate Bill 2236 (Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act) was "... never really intended to legislate organizational change, ..." but to "signal to the world that the U.S. was determined to do something to meet the problems posed by terrorism." (p. 86)

How the threat was to be met is explored in Chapter 7, "How the Organizations Responded." It is interesting to see how bureaucratic competition at times appears to take precedence over the evolution of an effective overall strategy, as illustrated in the attempts by the Departments of Justice and State to maximize their respective roles in dealing with terrorists.

In his conclusion the author notes that even if the organizational complexities were to be resolved and a fully functional response mechanism made available, the question would remain, "in any large-scale terrorist incident at home or abroad, will the organization and structures in place be the ones employed?" (p. 124)

Given the experience of the Iranian hostage crisis and the potential publicity surrounding any future major act of terrorism, one must share Farrell's

concern over whether an orderly response strategy would be employed. Will the ideas of crisis management be ignored as political leaders attempt to make their own policy statements through actions that may result in an essentially *ad hoc* response to a highly visible and emotional incident?

William Farrell has written a solid study that should not only be of interest to those concerned with the threat of terrorism but to others who desire a fine case study of the evolution of public policy and bureaucratic behavior on issues of current significance.

STEPHEN SLOAN  
University of Oklahoma

Levi, Werner, *The Coming End of War*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982. 183pp. \$22 paper \$10.95

Despite its arresting title, Levi's essay is less a prediction than a commentary on the political and military ramifications of current trends in international economic development. Levi accepts the conventional division of the world into developed and developing states. Developed states, he suggests, have increasingly sought to advance reasonable interests by nonviolent means (multinational corporations and organizations like OECD are among the vehicles easing the way for such transactions). This tendency, and the high cost of nuclear war, combine to make war among the developed states extremely unlikely.

Developing states possess neither nuclear weapons nor a network of transnational relations comparable to that of the developed states. But Levi sees such a network being created, as the developing states reach a level of economic sophistication that will make transnational cooperation work to their advantage. "The internationalization of national in-

terests," he predicts, is likely sharply to reduce the resort to war.

Levi's abstract and hopeful essay rests on the assumption that the leaderships of states will pursue rational goals by rational means—a questionable assumption indeed.

J.E. TALBOTT  
University of California, Santa Barbara

Hough, Richard L. *Economic Assistance and Security, Rethinking U.S. Policy*. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1982. 139pp. \$5

The United States Agency for International Development (AID) provides over \$4 billion a year in economic aid to less developed countries. This sum is split between Development Assistance, which is given for basically humanitarian motives and targeted upon the poorer people of the world, and the Economic Support Fund, which provides aid to selected nations because of their immediate importance to US security. The author of this book claims that this distinction and the policies that flow from it are inconsistent with US national security interests.

Based upon many years as an AID Foreign Service Officer in Washington and in Third World countries, Hough sees more than humanitarian concerns at stake for the United States in the development of the Third World. However, Development Assistance funding, which is spread over many poor nations, is highly vulnerable to cuts when the United States is retrenching in the face of its own economic difficulties. The budget for Economic Support Funds has been less vulnerable because of the identification of American security interests with the economic stability of countries like Israel and Egypt, its principal recipients in recent years.

If the United States had a better